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ABSTRACT Recent work suggests that offenders rate several alternatives
as more severe than imprisonment. We build on this literature by comparing
punishment exchange rates generated by criminal court judges with rates
generated by offenders and their supervising officers. Findings reveal that
none of the three groups rates prison as the most severe sanction and judges
and officers rate alternatives as significantly less severe than offenders.
Offenders are generally willing to serve less of each alternative to avoid
imprisonment than judges or officers. Serving correctional sanctions thus
appears to reduce the perceived severity of imprisonment and increase the
perceived severity of alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
In the dynamic world of corrections, alternative sanctions have become
a widely used and viable option for judges and offenders. With the
dramatic growth in the justice system over the past 30 years and the
introduction of a range of new non-custodial sanctions, the study of
their punitiveness compared to prison would seem a logical target for
research. However, there has been only limited study of this issue (May,
Wood, Mooney, & Minor, 2005). The scant literature on this topic has
focused on the concept of severity and how alternative sanctions have
changed the options by which our criminals can be punished, as well as
their place germane to custodial sanctions (Crouch, 1993; Petersilia,
1990; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994a, 1994b; Spelman, 1995; Wood &
Grasmick, 1999).
With the implementation of alternative sanctions, interest arose
regarding these sanctions’ place in a “punishment continuum” (Petersilia,
1990; Von Hirsch, Wasik, & Greene, 1992). General assumptions placed
probation and prison at the ends of the continuum, and alternative
sanctions were presumed to fall somewhere in between. Offender
perceptions of intermediate sanctions were first assessed in relation to
prison in order to substantiate the belief that such measures were less
onerous as custodial sentences (Crouch, 1993; Petersilia, 1990). However,
it became clear that more in-depth analyses would be needed, and
researchers began to study not only how these sanctions compared to
prison but also how such punishment equivalencies varied by gender,
race, and other offender characteristics (Morris and Tonry, 1990; Petersilia,
1994a, 1994b; Spelman, 1995; Wood & Grasmick, 1999; Wood & May,
2003). Such research has greatly enhanced the body of knowledge
surrounding offender perceptions of punishment and the factors that
influence these perceptions (May et al., 2005; Wood & Grasmick, 1999;
Wood & May, 2003).
As the current body of knowledge continues to expand, however, one
important population has been overlooked. Having a direct hand in
whether (and what types of) alternative sanctions are imposed on offenders,
it would seem that judges’ perceptions and attitudes towards these
punishments would be important to know. As the use of alternatives is
somewhat dependent on judges’ opinions of the severity of these sanctions,
assessing their views of alternative sanctions is pivotal in taking the
necessary steps toward the development of a more informed continuum
of sanctions. Accordingly, this study contributes to such a development
by exploring judges’, offenders’, and officers’ perceptions of the relative
50 PROBATION AND PAROLE: CURRENT ISSUES
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severity of alternative sanctions compared to prison by examining
punishment exchange rates generated by each group.
ASSESSING THE RELATIVE SEVERITY
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SANCTIONS
In regard to measures by which we punish our offenders, the general
public has traditionally perceived probation and imprisonment as marking
the opposing ends of society’s penalty continuum, with imprisonment
viewed as the most punitive sanction short of death (von Hirsch, 1990;
Wood & May, 2003). Misdemeanors and minor felonies might be assigned
non-custodial sanctions, while more harmful and serious crimes would
be punished through varying lengths of incarceration. Validating a
continuum of sanctions, however, has been no easy task.
When legislators and policy makers develop alternative sanctions
and make pivotal decisions concerning their implementation, they do
not base such decisions on experiential data, but instead rely on personal
assumptions and public opinion (Morris & Tonry, 1990). Nevertheless,
the assumption that probation and prison are located at opposite ends of
the continuum has been challenged of late, as recent work has sought to
better understand how offenders perceive and experience a range of
criminal justice sanctions (Crouch, 1993; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994a,
1994b; Spelman, 1995).
Petersilia (1990) argued that a disjunction between offender percep-
tions of punishment severity and public perceptions of punishment
severity is likely because (1) offenders typically do not live by the same
norms and ideas as the public, as evidenced by the law-breaking actions
that lead to their offender label and (2) offenders typically come from
lower socioeconomic strata, meaning their standards for living will be
significantly lower than the general population, especially when com-
pared to those in the position of adopting and implementing criminal
policies. Later, citing aspects such as the reduction in the harmful stig-
matization, a less isolative environment, and less deleterious effects on
future employment, Petersilia argued that prison itself may be losing its
onerous effect on those incarcerated. Research has since supported that
argument (see Flory, May, Minor, & Wood, 2006, for review).
The earliest literature exploring perceptions of alternative sanctions
and their place in the punishment continuum focused mainly on the
offenders’ perceptions of prison and how these new programs coalesced
with such views (Crouch, 1993; Petersilia, 1990; Petersilia & Deschenes,
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1994a, 1994b; Spelman, 1995). Crouch (1993) followed Petersilia’s
original work with a similar study that examined the preferences of
varying lengths of probation and prison among 1,027 male convicted
felons in the Texas correctional system. Offenders were given 11 pairs
of durations of either probation or prison and asked which one they
would prefer if given the choice. In 5 of the 11 situational comparisons,
between 25 and 66 percent of the offenders acknowledged a preference
for prison over probation. Crouch (1993) also found that older respon-
dents were more likely to prefer prison over alternative sanctions than
their younger counterparts and married respondents were willing to
serve less time in prison than their unmarried counterparts. His most
significant finding, however, was that African Americans had a much
stronger preference for prison than did whites.
Subsequently, Petersilia and Deschenes (1994a, 1994b) sampled 48
offenders who, according to statutes of the Minnesota Legislation,
would be prime candidates for intermediate sanctions. After collecting
basic demographic and background data, the authors solicited offender
perceptions of intermediate sanctions through magnitude estimation
(where a participant is presented with an average length of punishment
[e.g., one year in prison] worth an equivalent of 100 points and then
asked to rank other sanctions in terms of their total number of points)
and a basic rank ordering of 15 popular sanctions. In rank ordering sanc-
tions, offenders were given 15 alternative sanctions and asked to order
them from least severe to most severe. Petersilia and Deschenes (1994a,
1994b) determined certain alternative sanctions were perceived as equally
or more severe than shorter terms in prison, though five years in prison
was rated the most severe penalty by far. Spelman’s (1995) study of 128
Texas male offenders regarding the severity of 26 felony punishments
also used magnitude estimation as a means of ranking offenders’
perceptions of punishment. Spelman determined that the most severe
sanctions were three and five years of prison while a $100 fine was
perceived the least onerous and several intermediate sanctions were
ranked to be at least as punitive as prison. Like Crouch, Spelman found
that older and African American participants preferred a shorter prison
term to intensive supervision.
Using Exchange Rates to Measure Relative Severity
In an attempt to address the methodological limitations with magni-
tude estimation which relied heavily on the “numeracy of respondents”
among a population that is noted for being poorly educated (Spelman,
52 PROBATION AND PAROLE: CURRENT ISSUES
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1995, p. 112), Wood and his colleagues developed the “exchange rate”
method whereby researchers simply asked offenders to indicate the
duration of an alternative sanction they would serve to avoid specific
amounts of actual time in prison (May et al., 2005; Wood & Grasmick,
1999; Wood & May, 2003). This method allowed respondents to draw
on their own personal experiences to generate a punishment equivalency,
and required minimal mathematical aptitude to determine an accurate
response (Wood & Grasmick, 1999). Furthermore, this technique not only
allows for a comparison of alternatives with prison but also allows one
to consider how the various sanctions relate to one another in severity.
Wood and his colleagues have utilized exchange rates to examine
perceptions of alternative sanctions among a wide variety of groups,
including prisoners (Wood & Grasmick, 1999), probationers and parolees
(Wood & May, 2001; May, Minor, Wood, & Mooney, 2004; May et al.,
2005; Williams, May, & Wood, 2006), and probation and parole offi-
cers (Flory et al., 2006). These studies have determined that, in general:
(1) both boot camp and jail are viewed as more onerous than prison;
(2) Blacks are more willing to go to prison than Whites; (3) offenders
with previous prison experience are more willing to go to prison than of-
fenders without prison experience; (4) males are more willing to go to
prison than females; and (5) older offenders were also less likely to
agree to serve in alternative sanctions, particularly over a long period of
time, than their younger counterparts. Wood and his colleagues have sug-
gested that these preferences for prison are explained by a number of
factors, including: (1) failure to complete an alternative sanction results
in revocation to prison; (2) offenders view alternative sanctions as diffi-
cult to complete; and (3) officers overseeing alternative sanctions may
mistreat participants. As a consequence, offenders evaluate partici-
pation in alternatives as a sort of “gamble,” choosing the option that
they are most comfortable with, which often results in the selection of
prison over an alternative.
Exchange Rates Among Criminal Justice Practitioners
As knowledge regarding offenders’ perceptions of the severity of
sanctions evolves, a logical progression is to extend the same questions
to practitioner populations (i.e., supervising officers and judges). Flory
et al. (2006) compared the exchange rates of 612 probationers and
parolees with exchange rates generated by 208 of their supervising
officers. Of the nine sanctions included in the instrument, Flory et al.
(2006) found significant differences between offenders and officers in
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six alternatives. The most notable difference was in the officers’ mean
predicted exchange rate for probation, which was nearly double the
mean rate presented by offenders. Though this was the greatest discrep-
ancy, the same pattern was found among exchange rates for county jail,
electronic monitoring, day reporting, and intermittent incarceration.
The only sanction where the mean rate for offenders was higher than the
officers was for community service, as offenders claimed they would serve
more than twice the number of hours given by the officers. One explanation
for this included shame, as officers may find community service more
demeaning and embarrassing due to their possible exposure to community
disapproval, something that may have little to no effect on offenders.
In general, officers overestimate offenders’ perceptions of the severity
of prison.
One population with a direct hand in the implementing of alternative
sanctions is judges. A small number of studies have examined, both di-
rectly and indirectly, judges’ attitudes and perceptions of alternatives.
Finn (1984) examined judges’ responses to prison overcrowding and
determined that most judges cited that overcrowding was associated
with the lack of money needed to support the expanded services related
to probation and parole, as well as the building and maintaining of the
required alternative facilities. Judges also acknowledged the pressure
from strong public sentiment to lock away criminals. Cole, Mahoney,
Thornton and Hanson (1988) explored judges’ application and attitudes
toward the use of fines and determined that judges were willing to use
fines for more severe offenses. Lurigio (1987) examined the attitudes of
judges and attorneys from Cook County Illinois concerning the use and
implementation of intensive probation supervision (IPS). In that study,
a number of judges were reluctant to use IPS and none of the judges
reported that sentenced offenders chose prison instead of IPS (perhaps
because of its relative infancy in that jurisdiction). Wooldredge and
Gordon (1997) used a random sample of 181 chief trial court judges to
determine characteristics of the judiciary that would predict a greater
use of alternatives as well as judges’ willingness to use such sanctions.
They determined that judges presiding in courts with less structured
sentencing policies and longer minimum sentences were more likely to
be amenable to using intermediate sanctions. The same was true for
both smaller courts as well as courts with higher rates of plea bargaining.
Judges also cited more structured sentencing policies as limiting their
sentencing discretion and their ability to use alternative sanctions in lieu
of prison (Wooldredge & Gordon, 1997).
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Despite the previous studies that examine attitudes toward and use of
alternative sanctions among judges, no studies have examined judges’
perceptions of the relative severity of alternative sanctions when compared
to prison. Because judges have direct input in decisions about what
punishments offenders receive, their perceptions of the severity of
punishments and, ultimately, the punishment continuum are important.
Furthermore, it seems useful to compare judges’ perceptions of alternative
sanctions with those of offenders under community supervision, as well
as their supervising officers. Doing so can not only expand the body of
work surrounding the perceptions of alternative sanctions, but also provide
evidence that could lead to more accurate sentences resulting in offenders
experiencing the consequences intended by our judicial system.
Von Hirsch, Wasik, and Greene (1992) note that, “The time has come
to apply a coherent penal rationale to the development of, and choice
among, punishments in the community” (p. 370). In this study, we aid in
this process by exploring judges’ perceptions of alternative sanctions to
reveal the opinions and viewpoints of a population that, up to this time,
has been unobserved but has perhaps the most direct hand in the assign-
ment of intermediate punishments. Furthermore, as a substantial body
of knowledge exists that documents perceptions among offenders
(Petersilia, 1994a, 1994b; Spelman, 1995; Wood & Grasmick, 1999;
Wood & May, 2003), viable comparisons can be made between these
two groups. Despite gains that have been made, “more work is needed
to create a meaningful continuum of sanction severity and punishment
equivalency” (Wood & Grasmick, 1999, p. 45). As this work is performed,
studies may eventually shift from exploratory assessments to research
with more direct policy implications. The present study will contribute a
significant piece of the continuum puzzle that researchers have been
constructing over the past decade.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample
The data utilized in this study originate from three different sources.
Responses from judges were collected via surveys during the fall of
2004 from all the county judges that were currently serving in the state
of Kentucky and had presided over a circuit court (or were currently in
that role). Of the 132 active judges in the state, 96 presided in a circuit
court and 36 in a family court. A list of the names and addresses of all
Moore, May, and Wood 55
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the sitting judges in the state was solicited from the Administrative Office
of the Courts and consequently served as the target sample. Responses
from probation/parole officers and probationers and parolees were
obtained from May and Wood who have described their data collection
elsewhere (Flory et al., 2006 and May et al., 2005, respectively).
The instrument used to collect the data from the three groups under
study here was a questionnaire adapted directly from the one utilized by
Wood and Grasmick (1999) and Wood and May (2003) and has been
described elsewhere (May et al., 2005; Flory et al., 2006). This survey
was originally constructed after extensive consultation of incarcerated
prisoners in Oklahoma. After creating the instrument, Wood and Grasmick
then pretested it on 25 inmates asking them to pay close attention to its
wording and structure. Revisions were then later made based on these
findings as the instrument was then distributed to a larger sample.
Dependent Variable–Judges’ Exchange Rates
The final section consisted of questions pertaining to 9 alternative
sanctions including county jail, boot camp, electronic monitoring, regular
probation, community service, day reporting, intermittent incarceration,
placement in a halfway house, and day fines. Included with each sanction
was a short but detailed description depicting the exact ramifications of
that sanction in order to ensure that each respondent was considering the
same penalty (see Appendix A). After each description, respondents
were then asked to consider 12 actual months of medium-security
imprisonment and to indicate the exact number of months of the particular
sanction they personally would be willing to endure to avoid serving the
12 months of prison time. In doing this, the data will allow for the com-
parison of alternative sanctions to prison while also providing an indirect
means of ranking such alternatives in terms of perceived punitiveness.
Despite slight changes made to the wording of several of the demographic
questions among each group, the structure and overall makeup of the
instrument was maintained due to the acceptable reliability demonstrated
in all previous studies where the instrument was used (Flory et al., 2006;
May et al., 2005; Wood & May, 2003; Wood & Grasmick, 1999).
Procedures for Data Collection
Given that the procedures used to collect data from probationers, pa-
rolees, and their supervising officers have been described elsewhere
(see May et al., 2005 and Flory et al., 2006), we will limit the discussion
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of the data collection for this study to the data from the judicial respon-
dents. Permission to administer the questionnaires to judges was first
solicited from the Kentucky Administrative Office of the Court (AOC).
Once granted, the surveys were distributed at a state conference where
nearly all of the 132 active county judges were expected to attend in the
Fall of 2004. Despite our insistence that we be involved in the question-
naire administration at the conference, the distribution and collection of
the surveys was delegated to an AOC representative that worked in
conjunction with the research team. As such, the exact time, method,
and manner the instruments were distributed could not be controlled or
monitored. Nevertheless, we were able to compile the contents of the
packet to be distributed and, in addition to the questionnaire, we included
a cover page introducing the study, provided contact information in
case of any problems or questions, and insured the respondents of its
anonymous nature.
After the completed surveys were returned from the conference,
follow-up packets were sent approximately 30 days later to every judge
whose name and address was provided by the court administrator contact.
The packet contained an introduction letter, the survey, and a pre-stamped
return envelope. Given that we were no longer able to insure anonymity,
the cover letter provided details of the research, declared the confidential
basis with which data were to be collected, provided contact information in
the case of any problems or questions, and instructed the judge to discard
the questionnaire if they had completed it at the conference in the previous
month. Packages containing follow-up letters and copies of the
questionnaire were mailed approximately two weeks after the initial
mailing; a similar packet was mailed for the third time approximately
one month after the initial mailing.1
FINDINGS
Results presented in Table 1 reflect the general demographics of the
respondents (N = 72). As expected, the majority of responding judges
were middle-aged, white males who presided in big city suburbs.
They generally received between 18 and 20 years of education, which
roughly equates to earning a Master’s or Juris Doctorate degree. Sur-
prisingly, nearly two-thirds of respondents had been a judge either no
longer than 5 years or between 13 and 20 years. Concerning respondents’
practices and experiences in the courtroom, the majority of adjudicators
conducted less than 20 trials per year and most indicated that over 85
Moore, May, and Wood 57
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 TABLE 1: Judicial Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable Percentage
Age
45 years old and younger 13.5%
46-60 years old 69.4%
61 years old and older 17.1%
Gender
Male 84.3%
Female 15.7%
Race
African American/Black 2.9%
Caucasian/White 97.1%
Setting where judge presides
Country/Nonfarm 12.7%
Town of less than 50,000 14.1%
Big City Suburb 38.0%
Farm 12.7%
Town of 50,000-250,000 4.2%
City of more than 250,000 18.3%
Years of Education
17 years or less 4.3%
18-20 years 85.6%
21 years or more 10.0%
Judicial Experience
5 years or less 34.3%
6-12 years 18.3%
13-20 years 31.3%
21 years or more 15.7%
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Ea
st
er
n 
Ke
nt
uc
ky
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y 
Li
br
ar
ie
s]
 A
t:
 1
5:
17
 1
5 
No
ve
mb
er
 2
01
0
percent of cases resulted in plea agreements. While the bulk of respon-
dents admitted incarcerating between 51 and 250 offenders each year, it
was interesting to see such a wide and equal distribution of responses
when asked the rate of incarceration concerning offenders who were eli-
gible for noncustodial sanctions. Over half of the respondents reported
incarcerating between 0 and 30 percent of alternative sanction eligible
prisoners while their remaining counterparts designated prison terms to
Moore, May, and Wood 59
 TABLE 1 (continued)
Variable Percentage
Number of trials conducted each year
10 trials or less 35.4%
11-20 trials 47.1%
21-30 trials 13.3%
30 trials or more 4.5%
Number of offenders sentenced to prison per year
50 offenders or less 18.1%
51-125 offenders 40.9%
126-250 offenders 33.3%
251 offenders or more 7.5%
Percentage of cases that result in plea agreement
50% or lower 3%
51%-85% 26.9%
85% or higher 70.2%
Percentage of those eligible for noncustodial
sanctions that are sentenced to prison
0%-10% 21.6%
11%-30% 30.8%
31%-60% 27.7%
61%-99% 20%
Percentage of offenders who refuse to
serve an alternative sanction and opt for prison
0%-2% 62.1%
3%-6% 21.2%
7%-15% 15.1%
16%-25% 1.5%
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between 31 and 99 percent of those offenders who qualified for alternative
sanctions. Results also indicated that a small number of judges did in
fact have experience with offenders refusing to participate in alternatives
and rather opting for a prison sentence. In fact, over one third of judicial
respondents reported witnessing between 3 and 25 percent of offenders
opting for incarceration in lieu of an alternative punishment.
Given that (1) no research compares exchange rates of judges with
those of any other group and (2) we had access to data regarding exchange
rates from offenders (probationers and parolees) and their supervising
officers in Kentucky (May et al., 2005; Flory et al., 2006), we then
compared the mean exchange rates of judges with offenders and officers.
Results presented in Table 2 show that the exchange rates offered by
offenders are concentrated in a much narrower range of duration than
those generated by judges and officers. Exchange rates vary from 5.54
months to 23.56 months for offenders, but for judges the range is from
6.19 to 39.59 and for officers it is 6.05 to 44.23 months. The results
presented in Table 2 further reflect that offenders routinely rate alternatives
as more punitive than do judges or officers–with the exception of
community service. Offenders will serve an average of 1,817 hours of
community service, judges would serve 1,440, and officers would serve
only 700.50 hours to avoid 12 months of prison. Offenders clearly view
probation as much more severe as do either judges or officers because
they will serve about half of the duration of probation as judges and offi-
cers. For every other sanction, however, offenders generate lower ex-
change rates than do either judges or officers–meaning that offenders
will serve less of a given alternative to avoid 12 months of imprisonment
and view alternatives as more severe than do judges or officers. Relatedly,
offenders appear more willing to serve time in prison than judges or
officers when compared to alternatives. Note that the least severe sanction
in all three groups is regular probation, though judges and officers
would do nearly twice the amount of probation to avoid imprisonment
than would offenders.
A crude severity ranking of sanctions based on exchange rates provided
in Table 2 is depicted in Table 3. Prison is given a score of 12.00 because
all other sanctions are in reference to one year of imprisonment. Aside
from variation in the range of exchange rates and the fact that judges and
offices will do more of an alternative to avoid prison compared to
offenders, offenders’ and judges’ rankings of the severity of criminal
justice sanctions are remarkably similar, while officers’ rankings diverge in
some specific instances. Offenders rank halfway house as more severe
than judges, while judges rank community service as more severe than
60 PROBATION AND PAROLE: CURRENT ISSUES
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offenders. Offenders may not like the close supervision, the curfews, and
the ban on visitors associated with halfway house. Judges (and offi-
cers), on the other hand, may rank community service as more severe due
to aforementioned concerns about shame and embarrassment in the
community. Surprisingly, officers rank community service as even
more severe than imprisonment (3rd in the severity ranking compared
to 7th among judges and 9th among offenders), and their ranking of
electronic monitoring is much lower in the severity ranking (8th) than
that of offenders and judges (5th). Officers clearly view community service
as punitive, but view electronic monitoring as less severe than either
judges or offenders.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we combined data collected from judges in Kentucky
with data from other studies that we have conducted to compare exchange
rates of judges with probationers, parolees, and probation/parole officers
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 TABLE 3: Comparison of Sanction Severity Rankings Among
Offenders, Judges, and Officers Based on Exchange Rates in
Table 2*
Severity Ranking Offenders Judges Officers
Most Severe County Jail Boot Camp Boot Camp
Boot Camp County Jail County Jail
Prison Prison Community Service
Day Fines Day Fines Prison
Electronic
Monitoring
Electronic
Monitoring
Day Fines
Halfway House Intermittent Incar. Halfway House
Intermittent Incar. Community Service Intermittent Incar.
Day Reporting Halfway House Electronic
Monitoring
Community Service Day Reporting Day Reporting
Least Severe Regular Probation Regular Probation Regular Probation
*With regard to community service, we assigned respondents 20 hours per week, at four
weeks per month based on the total hours of community service for each group in Table 2.
Few offenders perform that much community service per week, and our calculation of months
of community service may serve to inflate the punitiveness of community service.
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from Kentucky, extending the extant body of research on offender
exchange rates (e.g., Flory et al., 2006; May & Wood, 2004; May et al.,
2005; Wood & Grasmick, 1999; Wood & May, 2003). The results from
this study suggest that, with limited exceptions, exchange rates offered
by judges more closely resembled exchange rates provided by the officer
sample than those of the offenders. With the exception of community
service, judges would serve longer amounts of alternative sanctions to
avoid prison than offenders themselves stated they would do. Further-
more, for county jail, regular probation, day reporting, halfway house,
and day fines, there were statistically significant differences in the
exchange rates among the two groups. In each of these cases, the exchange
rates of the judges were higher than those of offenders, indicating that
judges felt prison was a more stringent sanction (when compared to
these alternative sanctions) than did the offenders.
Nevertheless, the findings reported here also reveal that judges,
while offering higher exchange rates than offenders, differ slightly from
officers in their exchange rates as well. Judges offered significantly
lower exchange rates than probation and parole officers for community
service and significantly higher exchange rates than officers for day
reporting and day fines. Additionally, though the differences were not
statistically significant, judges would serve lower amounts of probation
and electronic monitoring and higher amounts of intermittent incarcera-
tion and halfway house to avoid prison. Interestingly, the mean exchange
rates for jail were almost identical among each of the three groups.
Consequently, the results from this research suggest five important
conclusions with implications for policy.
First, the results from this research reveal that neither judges, officers,
nor offenders view prison as the harshest punishment. In fact, if there is
one universal finding across the three groups, it is the consensus among
the groups that 12 months in medium-security prison is roughly equivalent
to six months in boot camp. We have now replicated this finding in three
states (Oklahoma, Indiana, and Kentucky) among four types of respondents
(judges, probation/parole officers, probationers/parolees, and prisoners).
As such, both the clients and practitioners in the criminal justice system
agree that boot camp (no matter where that camp is located) is approxi-
mately twice as punitive as medium security prison.
Secondly, in comparison to offenders and judges, officers would serve
far less time in community service to avoid prison. The implications of
this finding are twofold. First, as we have suggested elsewhere (Flory
et al., 2006), offenders (and now judges) may be basing their perceptions
on how much they would be “willing” to serve to avoid prison while
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officers may be basing their perceptions on how much community service
offenders on their caseload have “actually completed” to avoid prison.
Second, on the one hand, judges and offenders evidently feel that
community service is less hassle than what officers feel it would be for
offenders. Judges evidently do not share the same shame/embarrassment
or community disapproval that officers may feel while performing
community service. Officers appear to view community service as a far
more punitive sanction than the judges responsible for sentencing offenders
to community service and the offenders sentenced to community service.
On the other hand, it could be that this discrepancy is due to the intimate
familiarity that officers have with the delivery of community service; in
fact, the application of community service may be far more onerous than
either offenders or judges know. No matter what the cause, this difference
could have dramatic implications for community service as a condition
of probation or parole. Future research should explore this topic in greater
detail to determine why community service is perceived as such a severe
sanction by officers but not judges and offenders.
A third important implication of this finding is that when community/
local sanctions (electronic monitoring, halfway house, day reporting,
and day fines) are compared with imprisonment, judges feel these sanc-
tions are far less punitive than the offenders that they will sentence to
those sanctions. This has major implications for sentencing strategies that
are often based on the assumption that revocation followed by impris-
onment is the ultimate punitive sanction as a means of enforcing
compliance with conditions. The present findings, nevertheless, contradict
that assumption and suggest that the “hammer” of incarceration for
technical violations of community supervision is not near as heavy for
the offenders receiving the sanctions as it is for the judges delivering
them. Indeed, the findings presented here suggest that judges would do
as well, or perhaps better, to rely on threats of electronic monitoring,
day reporting, boot camp, or jail to enforce compliance. According to our
data presented here and elsewhere, revocation and subsequent impris-
onment are not as punitive to offenders as to officers or judges and
supervision strategies that take this into account might assist in reducing
the extent to which probation/parole revocations presently contribute to
prison crowding.
Fourth, in results presented elsewhere, Moore (2007) determined that
exchange rates for day reporting, halfway house, and day fine were best
explained in a context whereby a number of factors combine to influence
decision-making processes among the judges under study here. When
considering each of these sanctions individually, however, all are fairly
64 PROBATION AND PAROLE: CURRENT ISSUES
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restrictive but still allow a participant to be somewhat bonded to society.
Judges may be acutely aware that sentences are most effective when
offenders can maintain with the community or family while serving out
sentences. As such, despite the noticeable flexibility these particular
punishments include, which allows for offenders to maintain their
connections to the community, they are still somewhat restrictive.
This assumption may also explain the higher exchange rates offered
by judges for day fines, day reporting, and, to a lesser extent, halfway
house when compared to offenders and officers. These particular sanc-
tions may be extremely appealing to judges in that they can serve a dual
purpose by having “restrictive flexibility” that can satisfy the public
outcry for punishment while also allowing individuals to maintain the
established bond they have with the family or community. This initial
attraction may bring about a more positive overall view of such sanctions,
which, inevitably, converts into higher exchange rates.
Finally, though the initial tendency might be to simply dichotomize
the three populations explored herein (i.e., offenders, officers, and judges)
into either offending or non-offending groups, it is important that
judges be viewed as a separate group due to the tendencies revealed in
the data comparison. Like offenders, judges were found to have signifi-
cantly different mean exchange rates than officers for three alternative
sanctions (community service, day reporting, and day fines). Interestingly,
each differing rate shared the trend of provided judicial exchange rates
being higher than those offered by the probation and parole officers. As
such, the data collected here would primarily suggest that, of the three
groups explored, judges find prison the most punitive. However, an
alternative explanation may be that judges may underestimate the punitive
nature of the alternative sanctions, an act that would still explain the
higher rates offered by the judicial population and be in accordance with
the hedonistic calculus. This underestimation of sorts would be less
likely to occur in either the offender or officer population due to their
direct experience of either undergoing or enforcing each sanction.
However, when comparing all three populations, the data suggest that
more direct experience with the justice system tends to be associated
with lower offered exchange rates to avoid a one-year prison sentence.
The research reviewed here is not without limitations. There was little
variation by gender or race in the judge sample, two of the strongest pre-
dictors of preference for prison over alternative sanctions among of-
fenders. This finding matches that of Flory et al. (2006) who determined
few differences among the officers by race and gender as well. As such,
research such as this should be conducted with larger, more diverse
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samples from other regions to insure that the findings presented here are
not an artifact of the sample used. Secondly, research regarding perceived
exchange rates needs to be extended to legislators and other criminal jus-
tice officials to determine how their exchange rates compare with those
groups under study here. To develop a continuum of sanctions that is more
effective at controlling recidivism, and more just in delivering punishments,
input from all the aforementioned groups needs to be considered.
Within the limitations of these data, however, the results presented
here allow for the exploration of the perceptions of the continuum of
punishment among judges, offenders, and officers. Judges play an integral
role in the sentencing process, and a better understanding of their per-
ceptions of the punishments they impose should inform the development
and implementation of a continuum of sanctions that more accurately
embodies principles of desert and proportionate punishment in our criminal
justice system. Nevertheless, this effort should not stop here. Efforts to
examine perceptions of the punitiveness of prison should be extended to
legislators, parole board members, and other influential figures in the
realms of corrections and sentencing policy. These efforts should
eventually allow researchers to do a better job in designing equitable
punishments where some offenders serve their time in the community,
rather than in the costly “alternative to alternatives,” prison.
NOTE
1. The third mailing was sent only to judges who were indicated to be presiding over
a circuit court because several family court judges returned incomplete questionnaires
during the first two mailings where they claimed their experience and specialized niche
in the justice system had little connection with decisions to impose alternative
sanctions on offenders. Based on this evidence, we also assumed (but have no way of
knowing with absolute certainty) that any family court judge who attended the fall con-
ference likewise declined to participate in this study for the same reasons. As such, it is
likely that all respondents were circuit court judges. Nevertheless, we feel a conservative
response rate should be based on the total of 132 active judges, not solely those who
presided over a circuit court.
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APPENDIX A
(1) County Jail. If you are sent to a county jail, you may spend less time there than you
would in prison. However, living conditions are more restrictive in a jail than they generally
are in a large prison. Unless assigned to work, you may spend more time in your housing
unit, and there are not as many opportunities for sports, school, etc. Jail time is generally
viewed as more boring and more restrictive than prison time.
(2) Boot Camp. Boot camp is for a shorter time than you would have been sent to prison.
But boot camp can be more unpleasant in many ways than living in prison. Boot camp is
like basic training in the army. You live with about a hundred other people in one big
room. There is regular drill instruction like in the military and you are pushed physically
and psychologically to perform beyond your capabilities. You experience loss of sleep.
You are required to become physically active and fit. You are constantly supervised by
drill instructors that watch you closely. You are generally required to participate in an
education program. Virtually all your time and activities are controlled. You are subject to
random urinalysis tests and can be sent back to prison if you fail to obey the rules.
(3) Electronic Monitoring. On electronic monitoring, you live at home, but your freedom is
greatly reduced. You wear an electronic device on your ankle. If you get more than 200
feet from the base unit, the device sends an alarm to a computer. Then an officer who is
supervising you knows that you are not where you are supposed to be. On electronic
monitoring you are being followed by the computer 24 hours a day. There are strict curfews
and rules about when you must stay in your house. If you break these rules, you can be
sent to prison. You are subject to random urinalysis tests and can be sent back to prison
if you fail to obey the rules.
(4) Regular Probation. On probation, you do not spend time in prison, but the amount of
time on probation usually lasts much longer than whatever prison sentence you might
have gotten. You must see your probation officer at least once a month, but it can be every
week if ordered. You must get permission from that probation officer to travel or to move.
Your probation officer can require that you stay away from certain people. Your home or
car can be searched at any time without a search warrant. If you do not follow the rules
you can be sent to prison. You are also subject to random urinalysis tests.
(5) Community Service. When you are sentenced to community service, you live at home
and can have a job. However, you must work some time without pay to make up for the
crime for which you were convicted. You work for a government agency or some local
non-profit organization, and you do not have any choice about where or what the job is.
The judge decides the number of days and hours you must work. If you fail to work the
required days and hours, you can be sent back to prison. You are also subject to random
urinalysis testing.
(6) Day Reporting. If you are sentenced to day reporting, you can stay home at night, but
you must check in at a parole office every day. During the day you must have a job or you
must go to some center in the community and be involved in activities all day. These ac-
tivities might include working for no pay in the community, looking for a job, counseling, job
training, and education programs. At the end of the day you get to go home. You may be
required to work, and if you do you must check in every day during non-work hours. Failure
to abide by the rules can result in you going back to prison. You are also subject to random
urinalysis testing.
(7) Intermittent Incarceration. With this punishment, you must spend weekends or eve-
nings in the county jail, which typically is much more unpleasant than prison. But, since
you are not in prison, you can have a job and be involved with your family and community
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when you are not spending time in jail. However, failure to report to jail, or failure to pass
a random urinalysis test can result in you returning to prison.
(8) Halfway House. A halfway house is a place where several people convicted of crimes
live. There is no strict security like there is in prison, but there are firm rules that you must
follow. Halfway houses have rehabilitative programs, and if your behavior improves you
are treated better and given more freedom. Break the rules and you can be placed back
in prison. As always, you are subject to random urinalysis and searches, and constant
observation. You are not allowed to have visitors.
(9) Day Fine. A day fine is based on the amount of money you make each day. You are allowed
to subtract some money for your rent, transportation, food, utilities, etc., but whatever is
left over you have to pay as a day fine. For example, if you had $20 left each day after ex-
penses, your day fine would be $20 for every day the judge says you have to pay. If the
judge gives you a day fine of 90 days, and your day fine rate is $20, you would have to
pay a total of $1,800. Failure to pay your fines can result in you being sent back to prison.
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